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Abstract
We examine optimal price ceilings when the regulator is uncertain about de-
mand and maximizes expected consumer surplus. With perfect competition, large
enough regulatory uncertainty calls for softer intervention, with the price ceiling set
at a relatively high level compared to a full information scenario. In an imperfectly
competitive setting where symmetric firms compete in supply functions, with large
enough uncertainty, the optimal ceiling increases in the degree of competition, so
greater competitive pressure justifies less restrictive regulation. Under perfect com-
petition, we also pin down a cut-off level of rationing effi ciency below which a price
ceiling should not be used.
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1 Introduction
Although controversial, price ceilings have been used in a wide range of markets, in-
cluding those for rental accommodation, gas, electricity, telecommunications, pay-day
lending, and basic consumption goods. One rationale for price ceiling regulation is to
correct ineffi ciency stemming from insuffi cient competition, while another is the protec-
tion of consumers. The latter may explain the use of price controls in nearly competitive
markets, including those for rental accommodation in developed economies (see Glaeser
and Luttmer, 1997 and 2003, on US rent controls) and those for basic food products in
developing economies (see, Mbaye et al., 2015, on price caps in Senegal).1
Price ceilings have been used extensively in utility markets, where competition is typ-
ically restricted, to secure low prices for consumers. Sappington and Weisman (2010)
discuss their use in telecommunications, while Davis and Kilian (2011) examine empiri-
cally price caps in the US residential market for natural gas. A survey of regulators in
transition and developing economies by Kirkpatrick et al. (2005) found that price controls
had been used in 40% of the countries, most commonly in telecommunications (76%).
To correct market ineffi ciency, price regulation would aim to maximize total welfare.
But, recent years have witnessed an increase in the focus of policy makers and regulators on
consumer welfare and greater involvement of consumer groups in policy debate.2 Following
the 2002 Enterprise Act, approved UK bodies were designated ‘super-complainants’at the
Offi ce of Fair Trading to ‘strengthen the voice of consumers’and protect their interests.3
1Other developing economies with price caps include Kenya and Argentina. (See ‘Kenya Enacts Price
Control Law’on 16/09/2011 and ‘Argentine Peso Hits New Lows as Food Price Controls Take Effect’on
7/04/2014, both on Reuters).
2Empirical evidence suggests that lobby groups influence regulation, with small supplier groups being
more effective than consumers (a large but fragmented group). See Viscusi et al. (2005, Ch.10).
3See Offi ce of Fair Trading 511 (2003). Consumer organization Which? - one of the first ‘super-
complainants’- played a part in shaping tariff regulation in the UK energy sector in 2014. Consumers’
changed role may relate to utility market deregulation, increased market complexity (e.g., banking and
financial services), and growing evidence on demand-side biases.
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Moreover, in markets where the suppliers are foreign-owned, consumer surplus may be an
appropriate measure of domestic welfare. So the realities of regulation are more complex
and call for a better understanding of a consumer surplus standard in economic analysis.
This paper explores how market conditions affect the level of a price ceiling that
maximizes expected consumer surplus in a setting where the regulator is uncertain about
demand. Our framework allows for varying degrees of competition, so it fits a gamut
of market structures. We first investigate the impact of regulatory uncertainty on the
optimal ceiling for perfect competition and then the relationship between competitive
pressure and the optimal level of intervention. We also examine the effect of arbitrary
levels of rationing ineffi ciency on the optimal ceiling.
In our model, private agents have all relevant information. So, uncertainty is entirely
on the part of the regulator, who is aware of this disadvantage.4 This information structure
also covers the possibility that the price ceiling is a long term regulatory decision, while
short run market conditions may change. We focus on a frictionless homogeneous product
market where trade occurs at a uniform price. If the price ceiling binds, it lowers the cost
of purchase to consumers, but results in a shortage. For tractability, we assume quadratic
cost and benefit functions, but we argue that the qualitative results are more general.
A preliminary analysis of perfect competition with effi cient rationing shows that with
no uncertainty the ceiling that maximizes consumer surplus always binds (i.e., it is strictly
lower than the equilibrium price). Consider a price ceiling that is marginally below the
market clearing price: this has a negative effect on consumer surplus as some consumers
are excluded from the market and a positive one as those who still purchase pay a lower
price. As the marginal consumers excluded from the market have the lowest valuations,
the negative effect is small and completely offset by the surplus gains of all those who still
4For example, a regulator may be uncertain of the demand for new products.
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purchase. The optimal ceiling balances the gains and losses. We further show that this
result is robust for relatively low levels of demand uncertainty.
We next introduce arbitrary levels of uncertainty, and characterize the optimal price
ceiling.5 We show that suffi cient regulatory uncertainty calls for a price ceiling set at
a relatively high level and thus for softer intervention, compared to the no uncertainty
case. At this level the ceiling may not bind ex post, and so may not benefit consumers.
However, it offers protection against potentially high free market prices. To see the
intuition, suppose the optimal price ceiling under no uncertainty were set. If the realized
demand is low enough, the market clearing price will be lower than this ceiling and the
intervention will not bind. Then a marginal increase in the price ceiling would not affect
consumer surplus. In contrast, if the realized demand is large enough, this ceiling binds
and a marginal increase brings it closer to the (higher) level that is optimal for that
particular high demand, and so increases consumer surplus.
Our perfect competition model is relevant for interventions in fragmented markets,
like rent controls or price caps on basic consumption goods. To analyze optimal ceilings
in concentrated markets (e.g., telecommunications or utility markets), we employ an im-
perfectly competitive framework, which can be interpreted as the reduced form of a model
where identical firms compete in linear supply functions. We draw on the fact that in
this setting aggregate supply in equilibrium is a fraction of the perfectly competitive one,
which allows us to explore varying degrees of market power. The reduced form model can
also represent a monopoly, so our results apply to this limiting case.
If there is no regulatory uncertainty the optimal ceiling is the same for any degree of
5Although we focus on regulatory uncertainty regarding demand in the main text, in an online ap-
pendix we show that qualitatively similar results obtain in a model with supply uncertainty only (e.g.,
the regulator may be uncertain of what innovations are in the pipeline). We also outline in this appen-
dix the corresponding model with two-sided (demand and supply) uncertainty and explore its solution
numerically.
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competition. As this ceiling lies below the perfectly competitive equilibrium price, it is
also below the (higher) imperfect competition equilibrium prices. But, with suffi cient
regulatory uncertainty, we show that the appropriate level of the ceiling depends on
the degree of competition, as this determines the unregulated market price. The more
concentrated the market, the greater is the expected consumer surplus loss if there is
no regulation. This creates a stronger incentive to lower the price ceiling, triggering a
positive relationship between the optimal ceiling and the degree of competition. Thus,
with enough uncertainty, a higher price ceiling - that is, less restrictive intervention - is
justified in an environment with greater competitive pressure.
We also explore the impact of rationing ineffi ciency on the optimal price ceiling under
perfect competition.6 We determine a cut-off level of rationing effi ciency below which a
price ceiling should not be used, and show that our previous findings are qualitatively
robust when rationing effi ciency exceeds this level. Rationing is fully effi cient when the
goods supplied are allocated to the consumers with the highest valuations amongst those
willing to purchase. At a binding ceiling all consumers who buy the product enjoy a
higher surplus than in the absence of regulation. But with ineffi cient rationing some of
these consumers displace others who value the product more. If rationing is suffi ciently
ineffi cient the loss in consumer surplus from such misallocations, together with lower
supply, fully offsets the benefits for the consumers (who buy) at the lower price.
A vast economics literature analyzes the rationales, design, and impact of price regula-
tion (see Armstrong and Sappington, 2007, for a comprehensive review). In this context,
our information structure was first formalized by Weitzman (1974) to analyze the choice of
regulatory instrument and subsequently used in studies of optimal regulation (e.g., Baron
and Myerson, 1982, and Lewis and Sappington, 1988) that consider more sophisticated
6In our setting, the regulator cannot affect the extent of rationing effi ciency in the market.
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mechanisms. Lewis and Sappington (1988) show that in a monopoly market, a regulator
facing demand uncertainty could implement the first best solution by using a menu of
price-transfer pairs, when marginal cost is increasing. In contrast to these studies, we
focus on a price ceiling, a simple but commonly used instrument, which is particularly
relevant in markets where the intervention is fixed over a period in which demand may
fluctuate.7
Recent work has examined price cap regulation in oligopoly markets with homoge-
neous products, where both the firms and the regulator face demand uncertainty. Earle
et al. (2007) point out that an increase in a price ceiling near marginal cost may raise
welfare. Grimm and Zöttl (2010) show that there is always a range of ceilings that in-
crease production and welfare from the unregulated market levels and, for non—degenerate
uncertainty, this range is strictly above marginal cost.8 In contrast to their analyses, ours
focuses on a consumer surplus standard with only the regulator facing uncertainty.
Consumer welfare has sometimes been used in regulation in conjunction with a welfare
standard (e.g., for merger policy in Europe and the US). The consumer surplus standard
has been regarded as a way to redress the regulatory and policy making balance in favour of
consumers, a less represented group. Besanko and Spulber (1993) show that this standard
may offset some of the firms’informational advantage over the regulator.9 Nevertheless,
to be sure, a consumer surplus standard has various caveats, including adverse dynamic
consequences on firms’innovation and investment incentives and their long run survival.10
7Furthermore, some of the instruments required for optimal regulation (e.g., transfers) may not be
available in practice. See Armstrong and Sappington (2007) for discussion of practical regulatory policies
and Crew and Kleindorfer (2002) for more on the limitations of optimal regulation models.
8In related models, Reynolds and Rietzke (2016) consider endogenous entry and identify conditions
under which a price cap is welfare improving, while Lemus and Moreno (2017) explore the optimal ceiling
when a monopolist pre-commits to a capacity level before the demand is realized.
9Neven and Röller (2005) analyze how institutional settings, e.g. transparency and accountability,
interact with the choice of an appropriate standard.
10Moreover, to the extent to which consumers own the firms (e.g., through pension funds), this standard
may also be detrimental to consumers. See Motta (2004).
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Our work is also related to an emerging literature that explores ineffi cient rationing
under price regulation. Bulow and Klemperer (2012) examine the impact of price regu-
lation on consumers in a model with general demand and supply and random rationing,
but no uncertainty. They show that if supply is locally more elastic than demand, a price
ceiling always hurts consumers when demand is convex. By considering arbitrary levels of
rationing ineffi ciency and regulatory uncertainty, our findings complement theirs. Glaeser
and Luttmer (1997, 2003) and Davis and Kilian (2011) analyze empirically price regula-
tion and the welfare loss associated with ineffi cient rationing in competitive markets.11
We contribute to this literature by exploring the interplay between rationing ineffi ciency
and regulatory uncertainty. By parameterizing rationing effi ciency, we propose a flexible
theoretical framework that allows for a range of outcomes and extends previous work.
We explore how market characteristics affect a pro-consumer price ceiling in a sta-
tic framework. However, the introduction of a price ceiling is likely to have long term
consequences, most notably by affecting firms’investment incentives. Dobbs (2004) finds
that under uncertainty regarding technological change, a price cap reduces a monopolist’s
incentive to invest in capacity expansion. Also, Biglaiser and Riordan (2000) show that
dynamic price ceiling adjustments can distort incentives for capital replacement. Nonethe-
less, as argued by Joskow (2014), a price ceiling gives a strong incentive for cost reduction,
although consumers could only benefit later, when the ceiling is revised.12 A fuller analy-
sis of pro-consumer price ceilings would need to investigate the dynamic effects, of both
the instrument and the consumer-surplus standard, and to assess the relative performance
of different regulatory interventions in this context.
11Focusing on misallocations due to rent control, Glaeser and Luttmer show that under conservative
assumptions, 20% of rented apartments in New York City were in the wrong hands. Davis and Kilian
(2011) find substantial allocative costs in the US residential market for natural gas over the 1950-2000
period.
12Price ceilings also have dynamic effects in the presence of search frictions. For related work, see
Fershtman and Fishman (1994), Armstrong et al. (2009) and Rauh (2004).
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After formulating the model, we present a preliminary analysis of perfect competition
with little or no regulatory uncertainty. Section 4 introduces arbitrary levels of demand
uncertainty and section 5 analyzes the imperfect competition case. Section 6 explores the
implications of rationing ineffi ciency. Section 7 presents conclusions. All proofs missing
from the text are relegated to appendices.
2 The Model
Consider a market in which the regulator may be uncertain about the demand for a
homogeneous product. There is no uncertainty on the part of private agents. On this
basis, the regulator chooses a price ceiling that maximizes expected consumer surplus. The
regulatory intervention is announced to all private agents (producers and consumers).
First we consider a perfectly competitive market. Let consumers’gross benefit (or
utility) from the consumption of q units of the product be given by B(q, η) = (B + η)q−
bq2/2 where b > 0, B + η > 0. From the regulator’s point of view η is a random variable
with zero mean (E(η) = 0) distributed according to a twice continuous and differentiable
c.d.f. F(η) defined on a closed interval [nmin, nmax]. We assume that the hazard rate
F ′(η)/(1 − F(η)) is strictly increasing. The suppliers’cost of producing q units is given
by C(q) = Cq + cq2/2 where c > 0, C > 0. Then, inverse demand and supply are,
respectively, Pd(q, η) = ∂B(q, η)/∂q = B + η − bq and Ps(q) = ∂C(q)/∂q = C + cq.
Writing p for unit price, it follows that direct demand and supply are given, respec-
tively, by
qd(p) =






We assume that consumers and producers can observe η, while the regulator cannot.
This captures the informational advantage that producers may have over the regulator
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regarding demand.13
Denote by p∗ the ex post market clearing price (where qd(p∗) = qs(p∗)) and by q∗ the
corresponding output level. Then,
p∗ =
c(B + η) + bC
b+ c
and q∗ =
B + η − C
b+ c
. (2)
We assume that B + η > C for any η. This guarantees a well defined equilibrium output
ex post. Note that ex ante (before the demand shock η is realized), the regulator views





We explore regulatory intervention that takes the form of a price ceiling p̄, assuming
that resale of rationed goods is not possible. A price ceiling stipulates a maximal trade
price and only binds if the unregulated market price lies above the regulated level. If it lies
at or below the ceiling, the outcome coincides with the unregulated market equilibrium;
that is, for a given price ceiling p̄, if p∗ ≤ p̄, then q(p) = q∗ - as given by (2) - and if
p∗ > p̄, then q(p) = qs(p̄) - as given by (1). The c.d.f. of p∗(η) is determined by the c.d.f.
of η (F(η)). Since η is defined on a closed interval, so is the c.d.f. of p∗(η).
We then examine price ceilings in a model of imperfect competition, maintaining our
assumptions regarding the demand side of the market and the quadratic cost presented
above. We assume that there are N identical suppliers and each firm i’s cost of producing
qi units is given by C(q) = Cqi+Ncq2i /2.
14 We interpret our model as one where the firms
compete by choosing linear supply functions. Building on Klemperer and Meyer (1989),
13η may be unknown when the regulator sets a price ceiling, but revealed before the producers make
supply decisions; or producers may be able to adjust their behavior as information about η is revealed
by the market.
14This individual cost function guarantees that when the total cost of producing q using N -plants in
the industry is minimised, total cost is the same as under perfect competition (C(q) = Cq+cq2/2). Then,
the marginal cost curve coincides with P s(q).
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each firm chooses a supply function Si(p−C) = di(p−C), where the slope di > 0.15 In the
linear supply function equilibrium, a firm’s supply is only a fraction of its supply in the
perfect competition model (i.e., where the firms are price takers).16 Thus, with imperfect
competition, the firms restrict their output compared to that in the perfectly competitive
market. It then follows that the aggregate quantity supplied in the symmetric supply
function equilibrium at price p can be written as




where δ < 1 captures the restriction in output below the competitive level. Note that
δ increases in the degree of competition, captured by the number of firms, N . As the
market becomes nearly competitive (N → ∞), δ converges to 1. Alternatively, qs(p, δ)
can be regarded as an ad hoc way of capturing the restriction in aggregate supply in a
market where the firms have market power.
Using qs(p, δ), we can derive the equilibrium outcome in the unregulated imperfectly
competitive market. Denote by pδ the ex post unregulated market price (where qd(pδ) =
qs(pδ, δ)) and by qδ the corresponding output level. Then,
pδ =
c(B + η) + δbC
δb+ c
and qδ =
δ (B + η − C)
δb+ c
.
As in the competitive framework, the regulator views the unregulated market price pδ(η)
with imperfect competition as a random variable.
In general, price ceiling regulation may result in excess demand, in which case the
scarce output will be rationed. However, if there is some degree of rationing ineffi ciency,
15Klemperer and Meyer (1989) show that with unbounded demand uncertainty and a symmetric in-
dustry there is a unique equilibrium where firms choose linear supply functions of the form we consider.
This result holds for any distribution of uncertainty (even if it degenerates into a mass point), so long as
the support is unbounded.
16Akgün (2004) employs a related framework. We present a supply function competition microfounda-
tion for our model in the online appendix.
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this will limit the scope for pro-consumer price regulation. We therefore adapt our per-
fect competition model by introducing a parameter that captures rationing ineffi ciency.
Specifically, we write the regulator’s objective function as a linear combination of the ex-
pected consumer surplus for effi cient and for extremely ineffi cient rationing. With effi cient
rationing, the goods supplied are allocated to the consumers with the highest valuations
among those willing to buy. With extremely ineffi cient rationing, the available supply is
allocated to the consumers whose valuations are the lowest. Our objective function puts
weight α on expected consumer surplus with effi cient rationing and 1 − α on expected
consumer surplus with ineffi cient rationing, where α ∈ [0, 1]. This covers fully effi cient
rationing (α = 1), extremely ineffi cient rationing (α = 0) and all intermediate cases,
including random rationing which corresponds to α = 1/2.
In our model, the extent of rationing ineffi ciency is determined by market conditions
and is independent of regulatory uncertainty.17 For expositional simplicity, our initial
analysis assumes effi cient rationing. We then allow for arbitrary levels of rationing ef-
ficiency and show that the optimal ceiling that obtains under effi cient rationing carries
over for α above a critical level which depends on the slopes of demand and supply. This
critical level may lie above or below α = 1/2.18
3 Preliminary Analysis
This section introduces some of our results in a ‘textbook’framework of perfect compe-
tition and effi cient rationing (i.e., we assume that δ = 1 and α = 1). We start with a
situation where demand (as well as supply) is deterministic, and show that consumer sur-
plus can be increased from the free market benchmark by setting an appropriate binding
17α may instead also be interpreted as the probability, for the regulator, that rationing will be effi cient,
if this is independent of demand uncertainty.
18Random rationing could be used as an alternative benchmark, but then we would have to cover two
cases (with the critical level of effi ciency above or below 1/2), which would complicate the exposition.
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price ceiling. We then discuss why this result still holds when there is a limited amount of
demand uncertainty. The next section provides a formal analysis, allowing for arbitrary
degrees of uncertainty.19
Using the model introduced in section 2, let us initially assume that η = 0. Demand
becomes qd(p) = (B − p)/b, and the equilibrium price in the unregulated market is p∗ =
(cB + bC)/(b + c). For any price ceiling p̄ ≥ p∗, the market price is p∗ and consumer
surplus is given by CS(qd(p∗)) = b(B − C)2/2(b+ c)2.
However, any price ceiling p̄ < p∗ is binding so that output is min[qd(p̄), qs(p̄)] =
qs(p̄) = (p̄− C)/c. With effi cient rationing, consumer surplus is
CS(qs(p̄)) = Bqs(p̄)− 1
2
b (qs(p̄))2− p̄qs(p̄) = (p̄− C)[2c(B − p̄)− b(p̄− C)]
2c2
≡ CSLd . (4)
Using CS(qd(p∗)) and CSLd we obtain the following result.
Lemma 1 With no uncertainty, the price ceiling p̂ that maximizes consumer surplus
under perfect competition with effi cient rationing is given by
p̂ =
cB + (b+ c)C
b+ 2c
< p∗ . (5)
If a price ceiling were set marginally below the market clearing price p∗, there would
be a first-order gain in consumer surplus because the lower price would be paid by all
consumers who still buy the good, but a second-order loss of consumer surplus from the
marginal reduction in quantity supplied. With further marginal reductions in the price
ceiling the gain is made over steadily smaller quantities supplied, while the loss is steadily
greater because consumers with higher marginal willingness to pay are excluded. Thus,
the optimal pro-consumer price ceiling p̂ is strictly lower than the free market equilibrium
price p∗ and balances the trade-off. Panel A of Figure 1 illustrates this trade-off at the
19Under perfect competition, a price ceiling cannot improve (expected) total surplus. However, our
analysis focuses on intervention that aims to maximize consumer surplus.
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optimal price ceiling p̂. The consumer surplus gain is captured by the dotted rectangle,
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Figure 1: Optimal Pro-Consumer Price Ceiling with Effi cient Rationing
Before introducing uncertainty, we briefly discuss how the analysis above would be
affected by nonlinearity of demand and supply. It can be seen that, for a given demand-
supply intersection and given slopes of demand and supply at this intersection, the same
qualitative conclusion holds if there is strict convexity or strict concavity of either curve.
However, strict convexity results in a higher optimal ceiling, while strict concavity results
in a lower one than in the linear case. Consider the strictly convex demand tangent to the
straight line Pd(q) in Figure 1A at the intersection with Ps(q). The consumer surplus loss
from the ceiling p̂ is then larger than in the figure, but the gain is the same. Still, there
are binding ceilings for which the net gain is positive (e.g., a ceiling marginally below p∗).
A similar argument holds if supply is strictly convex. Then the loss is the same and the
gain is smaller than in the linear case. These conclusions are reversed for strict concavity.
We now introduce a small amount of demand uncertainty. Panel B in Figure 1 illus-
trates the highest and lowest demand functions, Pd(q, nmax) and Pd(q, nmin), respectively.
In this case, Pd(q) is the expected demand and captures a situation where the realized
20(1) can be written as p̂ [1− (b− c) /cεs(p̂)] = MR(p̂), where εs(p̂) is supply elasticity and MR(p̂)
market marginal revenue at price p = p̂. This gives a parallel with the Lerner index, but with an additional
relative slope term.
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value of η is equal to the expectation of η, E(η) = 0. For any realization of η, consumer
surplus is maximized at a price ceiling
p̂(η) =
c(B + η) + (b+ c)C
b+ 2c
< p∗(η) . (6)
This follows immediately from replacing B with B+η in Lemma 1. The expected optimal
ceiling is the same as the one in the lemma as E(p̂(η)) = p̂. This is because the objective
function only depends on the expectation of η, E(η) = 0. This simple reasoning is correct
so long as p̂ < p∗(nmin) - which is the case if there is only relatively little uncertainty.
Therefore, our result from the no uncertainty case carries over to a model with relatively
little uncertainty, and the price ceiling that maximizes expected consumer surplus binds
regardless of the realization of demand.21 In contrast, if p̂ > p∗(nmin), the analysis will
be different: such a ceiling may bind for some realizations of demand but not for others.
That is, ex post the market clearing price may be above or below the price ceiling.
4 Perfect Competition
This section fully investigates the impact of arbitrary levels of demand uncertainty, fo-
cusing on price regulation where the ceiling satisfies p̄ > C, so that supply is positive.
For a given price ceiling p̄, we define n∗(p̄), the specific value of η for which the market





where p∗e, the expectation of p
∗(η), is defined in (3). Using (7), we identify three price
regions where the intervention has different implications. We then examine each of these
21This analysis relates to the case in which the regulator faces a small amount of uncertainty over the
demand intercept, though the slope is known. If instead the regulator knows the intercept or the market
equilibrium point, for instance, but faces a small amount of uncertainty over the slope, the price ceiling
that maximizes expected consumer surplus is below the equilibrium price, as in our framework.
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regions as a potential location for the optimal value of p̄.
(a) The price ceiling always binds. p̄ < p∗(nmin) (i.e., p̄ is such that n∗(p̄) < nmin) so
a price ceiling binds regardless of η and this results in excess demand.
(b) The price ceiling never binds. p̄ > p∗(nmax) (i.e., p̄ is such that n∗(p̄) > nmax) so
a price ceiling does not bind regardless of η and the free market outcome prevails.
(c) The price ceiling may or may not bind. p̄ ∈ [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)] (i.e., p̄ is such
that n∗(p̄) ∈ [nmin, nmax]) and so the effect of a price ceiling depends on the value of η:
in particular, for low demand (when η ∈ [nmin, n∗(p̄))) the price ceiling does not bind,
whereas for high demand (when η ∈ [n∗(p̄), nmax]) it results in excess demand.
(a) In this case, as supply is a binding constraint regardless of η, output ismin[qd(p̄), qs(p̄)]
= qs(p̄) = (p̄− C)/c. Consumer surplus is CS(qs(p̄), η) = (p̄− C)[2c(B + η − p̄)− b(p̄−
C)]/2c2, and expected consumer surplus is E(qs(p̄), η) = CSLd , as given in (4). The price
ceiling that solves the f.o.c. of the optimization problem in this region is p̂ in (5).
p̂ is also the optimal ceiling with little or no demand uncertainty, as we show in Section
3. The limit on uncertainty for which this result holds can be specified in terms of nmin
(< 0). If nmin is close enough to zero (i.e., uncertainty is small) the price ceiling p̂ will bind
for all realizations of η, but for nmin further from zero it may or may not bind, depending
on η. Using (2) and (5), let n0 be the value of η at which p̂ is equal to the market clearing
price.




If there is little uncertainty (i.e. if nmin > n0), as d2CSLd /dp̄
2 < 0, (5) is a well defined
local maximum within the region (C, p∗(nmin)). But, with greater uncertainty, (i.e., if
nmin ≤ n0), CSLd is increasing for all p̄ < p∗(nmin) and the critical value p̂ is weakly
larger than p∗(nmin), which is inconsistent with the region (C, p∗(nmin)). This proves the
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following result.
Lemma 2 With small enough demand uncertainty (i.e., nmin > n0), in the region where
p̄ < p∗(nmin), the price ceiling that maximizes expected consumer surplus under perfect
competition is given by (5). But, if nmin ≤ n0, an optimal price ceiling cannot be strictly
lower than p∗(nmin).
After analyzing the other possible regions for the price ceiling, we will explore under
what conditions the price ceiling in (5) is globally optimal.
(b) The price ceiling never binds. With a price ceiling in the region p̄ > p∗(nmax),
regardless of the realization of η, the outcome is the same as with no intervention. For
a given η, consumer surplus is b(B + η − C)2/2(b + c)2. So expected consumer surplus
becomes
b[(B − C)2 + E(η2)]
2(b+ c)2
≡ CSHd , (8)
and is the same as in the free market equilibrium.
(c) The price ceiling may or may not bind. In this case p̄ ∈ [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)],
so n∗(p̄) ∈ [nmin, nmax]. We summarize below the main steps of the analysis, and relegate
the derivation of the expected consumer surplus to the appendix.
For any price ceiling p̄ ≥ p∗(η) (or, equivalently, η ≤ n∗(p̄)), the intervention does
not bind, and so the market clearing price p∗(η) prevails and the quantity traded is
qd(p∗, η) = qs(p∗). Since qd(p∗, η) = (B + η − p∗) /b = (B+η−C)/(b+ c) ≡ q∗d, consumer
surplus in this case is given by CS(q∗d) = b(B + η − C)2/2(b + c)2. We use CS(q∗d) to
derive expected consumer surplus conditional on p̄ ≥ p∗(η). For p̄ ≤ p∗(η) (or, equivalently,
η ≥ n∗(p̄)), the intervention leads to excess demand. The realized consumer surplus from
the qs(p̄) = (p̄−C)/c units produced is the same as in region (a), where the price ceiling
always binds.
In the appendix, we derive the expressions for expected consumer surplus in these two
cases. Then, we obtain total expected consumer surplus in region (c), which we denote
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by CSd. An interior optimum solves dCSd/dp̄ = 0, where
dCSd
dp̄












The two terms in (9) are related to the fact that a price ceiling p̄ may either bind or
not and they are weighted by their respective probabilities. The fraction −[(b + 2c)(p̄ −
C) − c(B − C)]/c2 is the value of dCSd/dp̄ when there is no uncertainty and supply is
the binding constraint, as in our preliminary analysis. The second term in (9) shows
the impact of demand uncertainty. εLd (n
∗(p̄))/F(n∗(p̄)) (< 0) is the expected value of
η, conditional on the ceiling not binding, and a more negative value represents greater
demand uncertainty.
The next result combines the analyses of the three regions and uses (4), (8) and (14).
Lemma 3 With demand uncertainty, expected consumer surplus under perfect competi-
tion is (i) continuous and differentiable for all values of p̄ > C; (ii) independent of p̄ at
any price ceiling p̄ ≥ p∗(nmax) because the intervention is not binding in this range.
In the appendix, using Lemma 3 and as the hazard rate of η is strictly increasing, we
show that the objective function is single-peaked over the three regions and the location
of the optimal ceiling depends on the degree of uncertainty. This leads to the following
result.
Proposition 1 Under perfect competition, if demand uncertainty is small (i.e., nmin >
n0), the unique price ceiling that globally maximizes expected consumer surplus always
binds and is given by (5); but if demand uncertainty is large (i.e., if nmin ≤ n0), it lies in
the interval [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)) and may bind or not ex post.
This proposition highlights the effects of the degree of uncertainty on optimal pro-
consumer regulation. The solution for nmin > n0 is related to the effects discussed in
section 3. It generalizes the result that, under no uncertainty, a price ceiling p̄ = p̂ below
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the market equilibrium maximizes consumer surplus. When demand is stochastic, it is
not known ex ante whether supply will be a binding constraint on consumption. But,
with small uncertainty, CSd is maximized with the same price ceiling, p̄ = p̂. More-
over, the analysis preceding Proposition 1 shows that an optimal ceiling cannot lie in
[p∗(nmin), p
∗(nmax)]. Instead it is strictly lower than p∗(nmin) and, implicitly, than the
expected market clearing price p∗e. Nevertheless, if the regulator faces enough uncertainty
(nmin ≤ n0), this favours setting a price ceiling that is relatively high and, therefore, less
likely to bind.
Intuitively, take the no uncertainty case: at the optimal ceiling p̂, supply is a binding
constraint and so q = qs(p̂). If we allow for small uncertainty (i.e., nmin > n0), then
at price ceiling p̂, supply remains a binding constraint and q = qs(p̂) for any η, and
p̂ remains the optimal ceiling. If instead uncertainty is large (i.e., nmin ≤ n0) and the
regulator still sets p̄ = p̂, this ceiling would not bind for very low demand realizations
(as the equilibrium price is below p̂), but it would still bind for high demand realizations.
Suppose the regulator marginally increases the ceiling to p̄ = p̂ + ε for small ε > 0. For
very low demand realizations, p̄ = p̂ + ε would still not bind and ex post output (and
consumer surplus) would be the same as at p̄ = p̂. For high demand realizations, both
p̄ = p̂ and p̄ = p̂ + ε would bind. But p̄ = p̂ + ε would result in higher consumer surplus
because p̄ = p̂ is the optimal ceiling when η = 0 and it is lower than the optimal ceiling
that would apply for any high demand realization (where η > 0). Hence, with great
enough uncertainty, expected consumer surplus is larger at p̄ = p̂ + ε than at p̄ = p̂, and
so the optimal price ceiling is higher than when there is no or little uncertainty.22
We now compare the optimal ceiling first to the expected market clearing price and
22This intuition also applies when the regulator knows the demand intercept but faces uncertainty over
the slope, which suggests that our results carry over unchanged to such an environment.
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then to the optimal ceiling under no uncertainty.
Corollary 1 With demand uncertainty and perfect competition, if nmin > n0, the optimal
ceiling lies below the expected market clearing price p∗e. But if nmin ≤ n0, the optimal
ceiling may be greater or smaller than p∗e, as CSd is maximized at p̄ R p∗e when −(1 −
F (0))c(B − C)− (b+ c)εLd (0) R 0.
Thus, with large enough uncertainty the optimal pro-consumer price ceiling may ex-
ceed p∗e. The following example illustrates this.
Example 1 Let η ∼ U [−n, n]. Then, εLd (0) = −n/4, F(0) = 1/2, and nmin ≤ n0 ⇔ n ≥
c(B − C)/(b + 2c). CSd is maximized at p̄ R p∗e as n R 2c(B − C)/(b + c). So, for n ∈
[c(B − C)/(b + 2c), 2c(B − C)/(b + c)) (for n > 2c(B − C)/(b + c)), the optimal ceiling
is lower (higher) than p∗e.
Although this section focuses on the role of regulatory uncertainty, the setting with
no uncertainty in section 3 is a special case where η has a degenerate distribution so that
nmin = nmax = 0. With greater uncertainty (for nmin ≤ n0) a price ceiling in the middle
region, p̄ ∈ [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)], is optimal. In this case, the no uncertainty optimal ceiling







∗(p̂)) ≥ 0 ,
where the weak inequality follows from εLd (n
∗(p̂) ≤ 0, and holds with equality only for
nmin = n0 (or, p∗(nmin) = p̂).
Corollary 2 With large enough uncertainty (nmin ≤ n0), the optimal price ceiling is
strictly higher than p̂, the optimal ceiling with smaller or no uncertainty.
Thus, larger regulatory uncertainty calls for softer intervention, with the price ceiling
set at a relatively high level compared to a case where there is no uncertainty.
5 Imperfect Competition
We now analyze the price ceiling that maximizes expected consumer surplus in the im-
perfectly competitive model presented in section 2. This framework, where suppliers have
19
(some) market power, allows us to study the impact of the degree of competition on the
optimal pro-consumer ceiling, and can be interpreted as the reduced form of a model
where firms compete in supply functions. However, we show that our analysis is also ap-
plicable in the limiting case of a monopoly market. δ < 1 measures competitive pressure,
and a larger value corresponds to more intense competition.
With no uncertainty, the optimal pro-consumer price ceiling from section 3 still obtains
with imperfect competition as consumer surplus is maximized at the same price level.
Recall that aggregate marginal cost is the same under perfect and imperfect competition
(see the discussion in section 2 and footnote 14). A binding price ceiling becomes marginal
revenue for all firms, and total quantity is given by equating this ceiling with aggregate
marginal cost, as in the perfectly competitive case. However, as we show below, this is
no longer true with large enough uncertainty.
Consider a realization of demand η. Then the equilibrium price in the imperfectly
competitive market is given by
pδ(η, δ) =
c(B + η) + δbC
δb+ c
> p∗(η) ,


























Figure 2: Imperfectly Competitive Price
A price ceiling p̄ binds or not depending on its position relative to pδ(η, δ). If p̄ ≥
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pδ(η, δ) the intervention does not bind and the imperfectly competitive market outcome
prevails. If p̄ < pδ(η, δ) the intervention binds and either demand or supply may be a
constraint depending on the position of p̄ relative to the perfectly competitive price p∗(η).
More specifically, if p̄ < p∗(η) the quantity traded will be qs(p̄) and there is excess demand.
If p∗(η) < p̄ < pδ(η) the quantity traded will be qd(p̄) and there is excess supply.
Consider our supply function competition interpretation. If the market is unregulated,
the firms compete by choosing price-quantity schedules. However, in the presence of a
binding price ceiling, the firms can no longer adjust the price, so they can only choose
optimally the output levels.23 When the intervention binds, p̄ becomes the (constant)
marginal revenue. Therefore the firms will supply the quantity at which p̄ equals mar-
ginal cost P s(q) unless demand is a binding constraint, in which case they supply the
quantity demanded at p̄. So, the quantity traded in the market at the regulated price is
min{qd(p̄), qs(p̄)}, where qs(p̄) is the quantity at which marginal cost equals p̄.24 This is
different from the perfectly competitive model where a binding ceiling could only result
in excess demand.
As before, we examine different price regions as potential locations for the optimal
price ceiling. The same three regions from section 4 apply, depending on the realization
of η. For clarity, in this section we will refer to these regions as (a´), (b´) and (c´). With
imperfect competition the potential outcomes for region (c´) are more complicated than
for region (c) in section 4 as either demand or supply may bind. We outline the analysis for
each region here but leave the details to the appendix. There is a minor difference in the
argument depending on whether pδ(nmin, δ), the ex post equilibrium price under imperfect
23In this sense, in a market where without intervention, firms compete in supply functions, the intro-
duction of a binding price ceiling leads to a change in competition as the firms become price-takers.
24qs(p) is the same as the perfectly competitive supply. In contrast, qs(p, δ) is the aggregate supply in
the unregulated market where the firms compete in supply functions and qs(p, δ) = δqs(p).
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competition for the lowest demand realization, is greater or smaller than p∗(nmax), the
ex post equilibrium price under perfect competition for the highest demand realization.25
We proceed on the assumption that pδ(nmin, δ) < p∗(nmax) and cover the reverse case in
footnote 27.26
(a´) The price ceiling always binds (p̄ < p∗(nmin)). The corresponding analysis in
section 4 carries over unchanged. So, if pδ(nmin, δ) < p∗(nmax) and nmin > n0, the optimal
pro-consumer price ceiling in this region is given by (5). But, if nmin ≤ n0, an optimal
ceiling cannot be strictly lower than p∗(nmin) as expected consumer surplus is increasing
in p̄.
(b´) The price ceiling never binds (p̄ > p∗(nmax)). For values of η at which the
ceiling binds, demand is a constraint, that is min{qd(p̄), qs(p̄)} = qd(p̄). Hence, a small
decrease in p̄ leads to an increase in consumer surplus. At values of η where the ceiling
does not bind, a decrease in the ceiling either has no effect on consumer surplus or, if it
has, it boosts consumer surplus as the unregulated market price is above the competitive
level for δ < 1. In effect, an optimal price ceiling cannot belong to this region.
(c´) The price ceiling may or may not bind (p̄ ∈ [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)]). We identify
two sub-regions as potential locations for the optimal price ceiling, [p∗(nmin), pδ(nmin, δ)]
and (pδ(nmin, δ), p∗(nmax)]. We sketch the arguments below and relegate the details to
the appendix.
(c´1) Consider first p̄ ∈ [p∗(nmin), pδ(nmin, δ)]. Since the upper bound pδ(nmin, δ) is
the lowest possible unregulated market price, the ceiling binds regardless of η. However,
25The sign of pδ(nmin, δ)−p∗(nmax) depends on all the parameters in the model. But, at least for a sym-
metric distribution where η ∈ [−n, n] there is a cut-off level of uncertainty at n = b (1− δ) (B − C) /b(1+
δ) + 2c ≡ n̂. For n > (<) n̂, pδ(nmin, δ)− p∗(nmax) < (>)0.
26Even if for some values of δ, pδ(nmin, δ) ≥ p∗(nmax), there exists a cut-off value δ0, so that for
δ ∈ [δ0, 1), pδ(nmin, δ) < p∗(nmax). This is because limδ→1pδ(nmin, δ) = p∗(nmin) < p∗(nmax). When




depending on η, the intervention may lead to excess demand or excess supply. The
derivation is the same as in the perfectly competitive case (with the critical value η =
n∗(p̄)) except that the upper bound to the region is at a higher price ceiling.
(c´2) For p̄ ∈ (pδ(nmin, δ), p∗(nmax)] the price ceiling may bind or not depending on
the value of η. The critical value η = n∗(p̄) again applies, and for high enough demand
realizations (η > n∗(p̄)) there is excess demand, so that q = qs(p̄). However, for lower
demand realizations (η ≤ n∗(p̄)) excess supply only obtains if demand is not too low. If,
for example, η = nmin, the equilibrium unregulated price is pδ(nmin, δ), which is below
this sub-region, and so the price ceiling does not bind. More generally, for values of η
below a cut-off value n∗∗(p̄, δ), the price ceiling does not bind and the quantity traded is
qd(pδ(η, δ)).27
In the online appendix we show that for nmin > n0, the globally optimal price ceiling is
strictly lower than p∗(nmin) and given by (5), whereas for nmin ≤ n0 it lies in the interval
[p∗(nmin), p
∗(nmax)].28 We are now ready to state the following result.
Proposition 2 For suffi ciently large demand uncertainty (nmin ≤ n0), the optimal pro-
consumer price ceiling with imperfect competition is increasing in the degree of competi-
tion. For smaller uncertainty (nmin > n0), it is independent of the degree of competition.
With no uncertainty, the optimal ceiling is independent of δ. But, with suffi cient
uncertainty, it is increasing in the degree of competition and, therefore, lower than the
one in the perfectly competitive market. A decrease in the optimal ceiling generates
significant gains in consumer surplus under high demand realizations. If the optimal
ceiling is lower than pδ(nmin, δ), so that it binds regardless of the realized demand, then it
is independent of the degree of competition and is weakly lower than in the competitive
27If pδ(nmin, δ) ≥ p∗(nmax) the analysis is qualitatively the same as we have outlined in the text, except
in one respect. By definition, sub-region (c´2) does not exist. Intuitively, the analysis in (c´1) above
applies now to the entire range.
28We show in the appendix that expected consumer surplus is single peaked.
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case. If the optimal ceiling is higher than pδ(nmin, δ), it may bind or not depending on
the realization of demand and it is smoothly increasing in the degree of competition.
With great enough uncertainty, the optimal ceiling is lower if the market is less compet-
itive. Denote by p̄c the price ceiling that is optimal under perfect competition and suppose
it were set in an imperfectly competitive market. For those high demand realizations for
which p̄c binds under perfect competition, it will also bind under imperfect competition
and so the same outcome obtains regardless of the degree of competition. In contrast, for
those demand realizations for which p̄c does not bind under perfect competition, the price
that obtains under imperfect competition (either pδ(η) or p̄c, depending on the value of
η) is higher than the perfectly competitive price (i.e., the market clearing price p∗(η)).
However, for any given demand realization η, consumer surplus is maximized at a price
p̂(η) < p∗(η). Thus, for each possible lower demand realization, price under perfect com-
petition exceeds the corresponding optimal price ceiling, and under imperfect competition
is greater still. To limit such effects the optimal ceiling under imperfect competition is
lower than that under perfect competition, and it decreases in the degree of market power.
In this sense, our analysis shows that, with suffi cient regulatory uncertainty, competitive
pressure weakens the scope for pro-consumer regulatory intervention.29
In our imperfect competition model, aggregate output is a fraction δ of the competitive
supply. This result builds on the supply function competition microfoundation and, in
the online appendix, we show that δ ≥ 2c/(c +
√
c(2b+ c)) for N ≥ 2. However, the
reduced form model with an output restriction can also capture a monopoly market when
δ = c/(b + c). Therefore, the analysis in this section directly applies to a market with a
29We focus here on the optimal ceiling that maximizes expected consumer surplus in the presence of
regulatory uncertainty under imperfect competition. Our intuition is that, in this setting, the expected
welfare maximizing ceiling would be at or above the expected market clearing price and - as the optimal
pro-consumer ceiling - is increasing in the degree of competition.
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monopoly supplier.
6 Ineffi cient Rationing
We now focus on the impact of rationing ineffi ciency on the optimal pro-consumer price
ceiling under perfect competition. We show that, if rationing effi ciency α is great enough,
the qualitative results from section 4 still hold, although the level of the optimal ceiling
may depend on the value of α. We identify a cut-off rationing effi ciency below which a
price ceiling should not be set.
We use the three regions for the optimal ceiling specified in section 4. In region (b),
as a price ceiling never binds (p̄ > p∗(nmax)), expected consumer surplus is unaffected
by rationing ineffi ciency and so is given by (8). However, in region (c) supply may be
a binding constraint and in region (a) it surely is, so for these regions ineffi ciency of
rationing plays an important role. For (a) and (c), we write the regulator’s objective
function as the weighted sum of expected surplus under fully effi cient rationing (with
weight α ∈ [0, 1]) and under extremely ineffi cient rationing (with weight 1 − α). Below
we outline the basic reasoning underlying the analysis of ineffi cient rationing, but the full
derivation is relegated to the online appendix.
When supply binds for a given price ceiling p̄, output qs(p̄) = (p̄− C)/c is bought by
the consumers with the lowest valuations amongst those willing to pay at least p̄. Then
the qs(p̄) = (p̄−C)/c units available are purchased by consumers along the lowest part of
the demand curve at and above p̄, i.e., from qd(p̄)−qs(p̄) to qd(p̄). For a given realization of





at qd(p̄) it is zero. So, using (1), total consumer surplus is then b(p̄−C)2/2c2 ≡ CSLd0 (and
independent of η). We use CSLd0 to calculate expected consumer surplus under extremely
ineffi cient rationing, taking into account that in (a) supply always binds, whereas in (c)
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it binds only for η ≥ n∗(p̄).
Below we extend Proposition 1 for arbitrary values of α. To do so, we define a critical
level of the price ceiling and a threshold degree of uncertainty, which generalize the value
in (5) and Definition 1, respectively, for arbitrary rationing effi ciency α.
p̂(α) =
αc(B + C)− (1− 2α)bC
2α(b+ c)− b and n0(α) = −
[α(b+ c)− b](B − C)
2α(b+ c)− b . (10)
Both p̂(α) and n0(α) are well defined for α 6= b/2(b + c). For α = 1, p̂(α) reduces to the
value specified in (5) and n0(α) = n0.
Proposition 3 Assume perfect competition. For rationing effi ciency α > b/(b+ c), there
is a unique price ceiling that globally maximizes expected consumer surplus: if nmin >
n0(α), this optimal ceiling is given by (10) and always binds; while if nmin ≤ n0(α), it
lies in the interval [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)). For rationing effi ciency α ≤ b/(b + c), any price
ceiling decreases expected consumer surplus.
This proposition highlights the combined effects of rationing effi ciency and the degree
of uncertainty on the optimal ceiling. Provided that α > b/(b + c), the qualitative con-
clusions in section 4 carry over. If uncertainty is relatively small (nmin > n0(α)) a price
ceiling in the low region (a), that is sure to bind, is optimal. This situation is illustrated
in Figure 1B. If uncertainty is greater (nmin ≤ n0(α)), the optimal ceiling is in region
(c) and may or may not bind. The critical uncertainty level, as represented by n0(α),
is decreasing in α. Thus, the greater is rationing effi ciency, the greater is the maximum
amount of uncertainty for which the optimal ceiling lies in the low region, and binds for
sure. The condition α > b/(b + c) is consistent with a wide range of ineffi ciency, e.g. if
demand is less steep than supply (b < c), it is consistent with random rationing (α = 1/2).
For large uncertainty (nmin ≤ n0(α)) and suffi ciently effi cient rationing (α > b/(b+c)),
the optimal ceiling may lie above or below the expected market clearing price. In the
online appendix, we present a condition which generalizes Corollary 1 in section 4 and
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also shows that, when rationing effi ciency α is smaller (but α > b/(b + c)), the level of
demand uncertainty required for p̄ to exceed p∗e is greater.
When instead α ≤ b/(b+ c) a price ceiling should not be set, regardless of the amount
of demand uncertainty. If rationing effi ciency is this low, price regulation has a large
allocative cost which eliminates the scope for pro-consumer intervention. If b > c, this
non-intervention result holds even for random rationing; but, if b < c, intervention can
increase expected consumer surplus even with worse than random rationing.
If uncertainty is great enough (nmin ≤ n0), then, generalizing our result for effi cient
rationing, the optimal price ceiling lies in region (c) and is strictly higher than p̂(α),
the optimal ceiling with smaller or no uncertainty. Moreover, Proposition 3 allows us to
characterize fully the relationship between the effi ciency of rationing α and the optimal
price ceiling.
Corollary 3 With perfect competition, for α ≥ b/(b+ c), the optimal pro-consumer price
ceiling is strictly decreasing in the rationing effi ciency α.
Thus, whenever it is optimal to set a price ceiling that may bind, there is a negative
relationship between the optimal level and the effi ciency of rationing.
7 Conclusions
We explore the impact of market conditions on optimal price ceiling regulation in a setting
where the regulator maximizes expected consumer surplus and is imperfectly informed
about demand. Under perfect competition, regulatory uncertainty does not eliminate the
rationale for price ceiling intervention, but suffi cient uncertainty calls for softer interven-
tion, with the ceiling set at a relatively high level. Under imperfect competition, if there
is suffi cient uncertainty, the optimal ceiling is increasing in the degree of competition
and so competitive pressure justifies less restrictive regulatory intervention. This result is
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broadly consistent, for example, with Oftel’s decision in 2002 to increase the price ceiling
imposed on British Telecom once new suppliers entered the telecommunications market.
We extend the perfect competition model to allow for rationing ineffi ciency and identify a
cut-off level of rationing ineffi ciency above which a ceiling should not be used. Above this
level, our qualitative results from the model with effi cient rationing carry over unchanged.
We focus on demand uncertainty, but our results are qualitatively robust in settings
with supply uncertainty only, or where the regulator faces both demand and supply un-
certainty, as we formally show in the online appendix. For tractability, we focus on linear
demand and supply, but the intuition suggests that our results are qualitatively robust
to more general assumptions.30 Likewise, the main insights would be relevant in settings
where the regulatory standard is a weighted sum of consumer surplus and profit.
8 Appendix
Preliminary Analysis
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) At p̄ ≥ p∗, dCS(qd(p∗))/dp̄ = 0. (ii) When p̄ < p∗, the
f.o.c. ∂CSLd / ∂p̄ = 0 gives (5). The s.o.c. is always satisfied. The optimal ceiling lies in
(C, p∗), so is well defined.
Perfect Competition
(c) The price ceiling may or may not bind.
Remark 1 (7) implies that prob(p∗ ≤ p̄) = prob(η ≤ n∗(p̄)) = F(n∗(p̄)).
Using Remark 1, expected consumer surplus conditional on p̄ ≥ p∗(η) is given by





/F(n∗(p̄)) ≡ CS∗d . (11)
30More precisely, so long as demand and supply (marginal cost) are well-behaved, demand is finite for
all positive prices, and there is scope for trade ex-post, the intuitive arguments carry over.
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Substituting for CS(q∗d) = b(B + η − C)2/2(b + c)2 in (11), and using εLd (n∗(p̄)) =∫ n∗(p̄)
nmin






(B − C)2F(n∗(p̄)) + 2(B − C)εLd (n∗(p̄)) + ΥLd (n∗(p̄))
]
/2(b+ c)2F(n∗(p̄)).
The expected consumer surplus conditional on p̄ ≤ p∗(η) is





/ [1−F(n∗(p̄))] ≡ CSSd .
(12)




(p̄− C) [2c(B − p̄)− b(p̄− C)]
2c2
+




Total expected consumer surplus for any given price ceiling p̄ ∈ [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)] is
E(CS(p̄)) = F(n∗(p̄))CS∗d + (1−F(n∗(p̄))CSSd ≡ CSd . (14)
Proof of Lemma 3. It is easy to see from (4), (8) and (14) that expected consumer
surplus is piece-wise continuous and differentiable. So we focus on the continuity and
differentiability of the expected consumer surplus at p∗(nmin) and p∗(nmax).
Continuity at p∗(nmin) = [c(B+nmin)+bC]/(b+c): limp̄↗p∗(nmin) CS
L




where CSSd is given in (13). The equality follows as F(nmin)) = εHd (nmin) = 0. Since
ΥLd (nmin) = ε
L
d (nmin) = 0, then limp̄↗p∗(nmin) CS
L
d (p̄) = CSd(nmin) so the result follows.
Continuity at p∗(nmax): As F(nmax) = 1, εLd (nmax) = 0 and ΥLd (nmax) = E(η2), then
CSd(nmax) = CS
∗
d(nmax) = limp̄↘p∗(nmax) CS
H
d (p̄) = CS
H
d and the result follows.
Differentiability at p∗(nmin): In region (a), limp̄↗p∗(nmin) ∂CS
L
d /∂p̄ =
[c(B − C)− (p∗(nmin)− C)(b+ 2c)] / c2. In region (c), as εLd (nmin) = F(nmin) = 0,
∂CSd(p
∗(nmin))/∂p̄ = limp̄↗p∗(nmin) ∂CS
L
d /∂p̄. The result follows.
Differentiability at p∗(nmax): In region (c), using ∂CSd/∂p̄ given in (9), along with
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εLd (nmax) = 0 and F(nmax) = 1, it follows that ∂CSd(p∗(nmax))/∂p̄ = 0. As (8) is in-
dependent of p̄, limp̄↘p∗(nmax) ∂CS
H
d /∂p̄ = 0. The result follows.
The second part of the Lemma follows as expected consumer surplus is continuous at
p∗(nmax) and (8) is independent of p̄.
Proof of Proposition 1. I Suppose that nmin ≤ n0. From (9), d2CSd/dp̄2 =
[−(b + 2c)(1 − F(n∗(p̄)) + (b + c)(p̄ − C)F ′(n∗(p̄)]/c2. As εLd (nmax) = E(η) = 0 and
F(nmax) = 1, p∗(nmax) satisfies the f.o.c. in region (c). CSd is convex at this point,
and so p∗(nmax) is a local minimum. Hence, CSd is decreasing in p̄ as it approaches
p∗(nmax) from below. Also, by Lemma 3, all p̄ > p∗(nmax) give the same level of expected
consumer surplus as p̄ = p∗(nmax). Using (7) and (9), CSd is increasing at p∗(nmin) iff
nmin ≤ n0. Moreover, by Lemma 2, if nmin ≤ n0, there is no candidate optimal ceiling
strictly below p∗(nmin). Hence, if nmin ≤ n0, the global optimal ceiling must belong to
[p∗(nmin), p













F ′(n∗(p̄))/ (1−F(n∗(p̄))) is, by assumption, strictly increasing on [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)]. As
1/(p̄−C) is strictly decreasing in p̄, CSd has a unique inflexion point, pdI . Since at p∗(nmax),
d2CSd/dp̄
2 > 0, CSd is convex for all p̄ ∈ (pdI , p∗(nmax)). But, if p̄ < pdI , 1/(p̄−C) is greater
and the hazard rate smaller, so that d2CSd/dp̄2 < 0 for all p̄ ∈ (p∗(nmin), pdI). Thus, when
nmin ≤ n0 there is a unique globally-optimal price ceiling in [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)).
I Now suppose nmin > n0. For p̄ > p∗(nmax), the ceiling does not bind and CSd is the
same as for p̄ = p∗(nmax). For p̄ < p∗(nmin), by Lemma 2 CSd is maximized at p̄ = p̂.
Lastly, consider the region p̄ ∈ [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)]. From (7) and (9) dCSd/dp̄ < 0 at
p∗(nmin) and so, from our argument above, dCSd/dp̄ < 0 for the whole region. Hence,
across the three regions CSd is maximized at p̄ = p̂.
Proof of Corollary 1. For nmin > n0, the result follows from (3) and (5). For
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nmin ≤ n0, we evaluate dCSd/dp̄ at p̄ = p∗e as given in (3), and obtain dCSd(p∗e)/dp̄ =
−(1−F(0))(B −C)/(b+ c) −εLd (0)/c. The second term is non-positive, while the first is
non-negative as εLd (0) < 0. Depending on the sign of dCSd(p
∗
e)/dp̄, CSd is maximized at
p̄ R p∗e.
Imperfect Competition
Analysis for region (c´)
As pδ(nmin, δ) ∈ [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)], we explore two sub-regions [p∗(nmin), pδ(nmin, δ)]
and (pδ(nmin, δ), p∗(nmax)].
(c´1) If p̄ ∈ [p∗(nmin), pδ(nmin, δ)], the ceiling binds regardless of η. For a given p̄, ∃
η = n∗(p̄) s.t. p∗(η) = p̄. This is the same as n∗(p̄) in (7). If p̄ ≥ p∗(η) (i.e., if η ≤ n∗(p̄)),
there is excess supply, so consumer surplus is determined by qd(p̄). If p̄ < p∗(η) (i.e., if
η > n∗(p̄)), then there is excess demand, so consumer surplus is determined by qs(p̄), the
quantity at which marginal cost equals p̄. Let CSLδ be the expected consumer surplus in
this case. Then, using εLd (n
∗(p̄)) as defined in section 4, dCSLδ /dp̄ is given by
−1
b




(b+ c) [c(B − C)− (b+ c) (p̄− C)]
bc2
(1−F(n∗(p̄))) . (15)
(c´2) For p̄ ∈ (pδ(nmin, δ), p∗(nmax)] the ceiling may bind or not depending on η. There
is a cut-offη, let it be n∗∗(p̄, δ), implicitly defined by pδ(n∗∗, δ) = p̄, so that for η < n∗∗(p̄, δ)
the ceiling does not bind and the quantity traded is qd(pδ(η, δ)). For η ≥ n∗∗(p̄, δ),
the ceiling may lead to excess demand or excess supply depending on the value of η.
Specifically, ∃η = n∗(p̄) for which p∗(η) = p̄. This is the same as the one in (7), and
n∗∗(p̄, δ) < n∗(p̄). If n∗∗(p̄, δ) ≤ η ≤ n∗(p̄), there is excess supply, so that consumer
surplus is determined by qd(p̄). If η > n∗(p̄), there is excess demand and consumer
surplus is determined by qs(p̄), the quantity at which marginal cost equals p̄. Let CSHδ
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be the expected consumer surplus in this case. Then, dCSHδ /dp̄ is given by
−1
b









c(B − p̄)− (b+ c)(p̄− C)
c2
(1−F(n∗(p̄))) ,




Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose nmin > −c(B − C)/(b + 2c). Then the globally
optimal price ceiling is given by (5) and independent of δ.
Suppose nmin < −c(B − C)/(b + 2c). Let pδ(nmin, δ) < p∗(nmax). If the globally optimal
ceiling lies in [p∗(nmin), pδ(nmin, δ)), it solves dCSLδ /dp̄ = 0 (see (15)). Evaluating (15) at
the ceiling that solves dCSd/dp̄ = 0, i.e., the optimal ceiling under perfect competition (see
(9)), we obtain −[(B− p̄)F(n∗(p̄))+ εLd (n∗(p̄))]/b = −[(B− p̄)+ εLd (n∗(p̄))/F(n∗(p̄))]/b <
0. The inequality follows as εLd (n
∗(p̄))/ F(n∗(p̄)) = E(η | η < n∗(p̄)) ∈ [nmin, nmax].
If the globally optimal ceiling lies in [pδ(nmin, δ), p∗(nmax)), it solves dCSHδ /dp̄ = 0 (see
(16)). Whenever CSHδ has an interior maximum in the interval (p
δ(nmin, δ), p
∗(nmax)], the
optimal ceiling is increasing in δ. This follows from the local concavity of CSHδ at the
optimal ceiling and from d(CSδH)
2/dp̄dδ = δb(p̄− C)2F ′(n∗∗(p̄, δ))/c2 > 0. If the optimal
price ceiling with imperfect competition lies in this sub-region, it is strictly lower than the
optimal ceiling with perfect competition. Let pδ(nmin, δ) ≥ p∗(nmax). Then, the globally
optimal ceiling lies in [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)) and solves dCSLδ /dp̄ = 0. The above comparison
with the optimal ceiling under perfect competition applies and the result follows.
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